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533 B. The statement that mathematics have a scientific basis only when referred to the Idea of Good is a half truth which is practically a falsehood. Plato's thought, as I have elsewhere shown, is: (1) All social and moral institutions can be understood only in their relation to an ultimate ideal of good. (2) They can be related to that ideal only by a mind disciplined in abstractions and the severest dialectic. (3) Mathematics affords the best preliminary discipline in abstractions, but is not the highest dialectic, because the mathematician cannot, like the dialectician, go behind his premises when required to do so, till ultimate acceptable postulates are reached. This conception of dialectic in no wise contradicts that of Philebus 58 A, that it deals with *ὅν* *qua* *ὅν* in Aristotle's language. (4) As applied to the material world, the Idea of Good is an ultimate *ἀρχή* only as faith sees it embodied in the beneficent designs of God. Its operation cannot be traced in detail, and it is not in this sense an essential part of the thought of the Republic.

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PAUL SHOREY.

Geschichte des Plusquamperfekts im Lateinischen von Dr. H. BLASE. Giessen, 1894. Pp. 112.

The author, one of the collaborators upon the new historical grammar, is well and favorably known through his dissertation on conditional sentences and his admirable *Geschichte des Irrealis*. The present pamphlet deals with the pluperfect in both indicative and subjunctive. As to the indicative, the whole question, in Blase's opinion, has been confused rather than clarified by the introduction of the 'absolute' and 'relative' notions. The true question is, 'What is the relation of the pluperfect to its temporal environment?' Foth, in Böhmer's *Romanische Studien*, 1876, has shown from the Romance languages that the Latin pluperfect underwent a shifting of meaning. The indicative became a preterite in French, a conditional in Spanish, Portuguese and Provençal; the subjunctive became an imperfect. Foth's results are in the main correct, but his division of Latin verbs into two classes, in one of which the perfect, because of the meaning of the verb, acquires the force of a present, Blase thinks erroneous. He therefore examines the facts of usage in Plautus, with these results: (1) The plupf. in early Latin is often used in its proper sense when the past act to which it is related is not mentioned in the immediate context. (2) In about ten cases the perf. and the plupf. are coordinated; this may be explained by metrical convenience. (3) The plupf. is also used rhetorically in anticipation of an immediately following past tense. (4) There are no 'absolute' uses of the plupf. (5) Shifting occurs only with *fueram*, a) alone, b) with *aequom*, *par*, etc., c) with perf. pass. etc. In all these cases it is equivalent to *eram* or *fui*. This shift of tense-force is due to the combination of *fui* and *eram* (Combinationsausgleichung), while e. g. *dixi* and *dixebam* could not unite into *dixeram*. This explains the occurrence with *fueram* only.

In the classical Latin the usage widens to include a few cases of *habueram* and verbs meaning *can* and *ought*, perhaps under the influence of *aequom fuerat*. The rhetorical use (3 above) is common in Vergil and the historians.

The tendency to shift continues down to the fourth century and then shows a great extension among the African writers, no doubt because of the incompleteness of the Semitic tense-system. The use of *fuera*m for *era*m with perf. ptc., which the more accurate writers like Cicero and Caesar avoid, became very frequent and in some late writers predominant. See table on pp. 60-1.

As to the plupf. subjunctive, it is assumed that its original temporal meaning was the same as that of the plupf. indicative, but the cause of the shifting of tense-force was a different one, which Blase had already discussed in his *Geschichte des Irrealis*. The Latin had at first no form for unreal conditions, but used sometimes the present subjunctive for present conditions and the imperfect indicative for the past. When the impf. and plupf. subjunctive assumed this function, beginning about the time of Plautus, they necessarily assumed also the tense-force of such conditions, the impf. becoming a present and the plupf. a preterite. This use, however, was almost confined during the classical period to conditional and optative sentences, and extended itself more slowly, though in the end more evenly, than the corresponding shift in the indicative. The indicative became partly a preterite, partly a conditional, showing by the variation that the process was not complete in Latin, but the subjunctive became a preterite in all branches of the derived languages.

This is a valuable presentation of facts which have either not been observed or not collected before, and it is also a good piece of scientific work, in which causes and effects are well brought out. There are certainly great advantages in a method which traces a single phenomenon through many authors over the method which follows out all the usages of a single author, and Blase has used the opportunity well. The pamphlet must be read by all students of the history of modes and tenses.

I must, however, say that I have not been convinced by Blase's explanation of the origin of the shifting. In the first place, what Ziemer calls 'Combinationsausgleichung' results in the combination of two constructions, but I do not know any case where it results in the use of a third and different word. *impertio alicui salutem* and *dono aliquem salute* may give *impertio aliquem salute*, but it does not follow, without more proof, that *fui* and *eram* could draw *fuera*m away from its ordinary sense to a tense-force somewhere between *eram* and *fui* or could create a new word *fuera*m. Second, in order to explain the origin in this way, Blase has to show that the shifting in early Latin is found only with *fuera*m, not, e. g., with *dixera*m. The reasoning by which he seeks to do this (pp. 18-20) seems to me insufficient and even wrong in method. For example, of Merc. 975 *ille quidem illam sese ancillam emisse dixerat*, he says, "Das war schon v. 390 geschehen"; of Capt. 194 . . . *quo ire dixeram* . . ., "Das hat er v. 126 gesagt, also = bevor alles das geredet wurde, was zwischen v. 126 u. 194 steht." But the same reasoning might be used of *dixi* Capt. prol. 59; it was in v. 24 that he had spoken of the war, and meanwhile he had been speaking of the argument of the play. So *dixi* Capt. 558 refers back to 547, before Aristophontes had interrupted the talk. And, generally, it is plain that half the perfects would refer back to something said before some other event had occurred. Some sharper test than Blase uses is needed to disprove the whole of Lübbert's doctrine. And even in the modified form in which Blase uses it, the explanation of the coordination of *dixi* and *dixera*m by metrical convenience is not

satisfying. In the third place, Foth's suggestion that the meaning of the verb influences its tense-force is too good to be dropped. It rests upon and explains too many facts, e. g. the use of *habui* and *fui* 'I had (was), but have (am) not now,' the use of the same perf. form for inchoatives and for simple verbs, the Plautine *adstiti* = *adsto*, and others. It would explain also the very important fact, which Blase's theory does not explain, that, however the shifting may have begun, it spreads along the line of verb-meaning, from *aequom fuerat* to *debuerat* and *oportuerat*.

To point out flaws in so good a piece of work as this is an ungrateful task, but what I have said touches at most only a small part of the book.

E. P. MORRIS.

Was ist Syntax? Ein kritischer Versuch von JOHN RIES. Marburg, 1894. Pp. 163.

The author is a Germanic philologist and his illustrations are drawn largely from this field, but his arguments and conclusions have a general application and deserve the notice of classical philologists. The outline of the argument is this:—

The meaning of syntax and its relation to other parts of grammar call for new definition. Three systems have hitherto been followed. First, the mixed system, in which the arrangement is partly logical, partly formal; second, the system of Miklosich, which avoids the confusion of the mixed system by confining syntax to the doctrine of the meaning of words and classes of words, omitting all study of the clause; third, the system which makes syntax the science of the sentence. The mixed system is condemned by its nature, and the system of Miklosich by its exclusion of the most important part of syntax. The third doctrine, that *Syntax ist Satzlehre*, is now somewhat widely held, but is also open to serious objections. The sentence is a logical rather than a linguistic unit, the definitions of a sentence vary greatly, and phrases and clauses can be treated only as parts of a sentence. Difficulties therefore arise in the application of the doctrine. Schmalz, in Müller's Handbuch, vol. II, under the heading Simple Sentences, treats cases, modes, tenses, i. e. falls into mixed syntax, and, still worse, he treats these under declarative sentences, as if they did not belong equally to interrogative sentences.

The way out of all this confusion is to substitute the series *sound—word—combination of words* for the series *sound—word—sentence*, as descriptive of the three kinds of objects treated in grammar, and to recognize the fundamental distinction between *form* and *meaning*. This gives (omitting sounds, which have no corresponding meaning and can be treated only from the formal point of view) a cross-division, according as we classify by the object treated or by the method, thus:

	<i>Words.</i>	<i>Word-combinations.</i>
<i>Form.</i>	Inflection.	Syntactical Forms.
<i>Meaning.</i>	Semasiology.	Syntactical Functions.